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ABSTRACT 
Philosophical views defending shame as a catalyst for moral virtue are at odds with empirical data indicating 
that shame often yields psychologically unhealthy responses for those who feel it, and often motivates in them 
morally worse action than whatever occasioned the initial shame experience. Our interdisciplinary ethnographic 
study analyzes the shame experiences of lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) conservative Christians 
and the church members who once shamed them but are now allies. In this context, shame, humility, and 
proper pride work together amid hierarchies of social power to influence peoples’ motivation, ability, or lack 
thereof to love and care for others. Shame may catalyze virtue, but not where it has been imposed as a chronic 
disposition. 
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1. Introduction 
Is shame always toxic or can it motivate virtuous action and foster thriving? We address this question drawing 
from our qualitative sociological and philosophical study of the US-based conservative Christian movement to 
open dialogue with lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) people, and to affirm LGBT identities, 
alternative gender expressions, and in some cases same-sex marriage.1 Here we consider the shame experiences 
of both LGBT conservative Christians and the heterosexual, cisgender2. Christians who have become their allies. 
This study illuminates the value of shame as a tool for moral education by showing that we must consider what 
kind of shame people experience and under what conditions. To moral educators interested in whether shame 
promotes virtue, our analysis suggests that we cannot adequately approach the question without understanding 
the substantive content of shame and humility, the relationship between them, and their roles in everyday 
social relations. 
Some moral philosophers argue that feeling moral shame—ashamed for one’s moral flaws—can lead people to 
become morally better and to restore damaged relationships (Aristotle, 1999; Flanagan, O. 2013; Manion, 2002; 
Shotwell, 2011). However, the empirical literature from psychology suggests that feeling shame often seems 
either to stifle action (Karlsson & Sjoberg, 2009) or to motivate morally worse action than whatever occasioned 
the initial shame experience, including aggression and violence (Lewis, 1992; Pattison, 2000; Tangney, 2007). 
Shame also often yields psychologically unhealthy responses for those who feel it, including rage or depression 
(Lewis, 1992). In light of these data, some philosophers defend moral shame more cautiously, arguing that even 
if feeling shame often does not yield moral improvement, a liability to feel shame retains moral value because it 
indicates the presence of humility: a person’s self-understanding responds to others’ experiences of them 
(Calhoun, 2004, Thomason, 2015). 
While recognizing shame as a ‘social emotion,’ many scholars nevertheless treat it (and morality) as a property 
of individuals (Taylor, 1985; Turner & Stets, 2006; Moll et al., 2007; Tangney, 2007). Social and cognitive 
psychologists focusing on the ‘moral self’ have found links between selfhood and morality using survey or 
neuroimaging methods (Han, 2017; Han, Chen, Jeong, & Glover, 2016; Hardy & Carlo, 2005; Hardy, Walker, 
Olsen, Woodbury, & Hickman, 2014; Moll et al., 2007). Similarly, philosophers who link shame and humility treat 
these as individual properties, not appreciating how social power dynamics can disrupt this link, nor more 
generally how social power shapes peoples’ experiences of and responses to shame in ways that may either 
support or undercut virtue development (Thomason, 2015).  
Rather than treating emotions and morality as individual traits, we begin with the premise that human beings 
are social creatures. A person’s identity is intersubjectively constituted over time as they internalize significant 
others’ perceptions of them through interpersonal interactions in contexts of social power (Goffman, 1967; 
Mead [1934] 1967). We also approach morality as a social practice, rather than as a set of individual beliefs or 
attitudes. We investigate the link between self-concept and moral action as people experience it in daily 
interactional life, the contexts in which people define and experience collectively what is moral, what is virtuous, 
and what promotes thriving (Calhoun, 2004; Walker, 2007). Marie may feel virtuous in making certain decisions, 
but others’ experience and moral assessment of her actions may reveal consequences and meanings that 
overshadow her intentions. Those assessments may, and often should, impinge on her self-conception. We 
argue that like shame, humility is best understood in the context of social relationships. We use qualitative 
sociological data to examine the social dynamics of shame and humility, and to argue that a liability to humility 
and healthy pride—two sides of the same coin—influences the extent to which a person is liable to experience 
shame as a motivation to virtue. 
After discussing our methods (§2), we define shame and provide an overview of different types of shame 
experiences in the context of social relations (§3). We then discuss the totalizing, chronic shame our LGBT 
conservative Christian participants report experiencing (§4). In light of these data, §5 complicates philosophical 
arguments that link the moral value of feeling shame with humility by showing that a liability to shame does 
not itself indicate the presence of humility. Rather, whether one experiences shame as chronic or only episodic 
influences whether one develops humility, which in turns shapes shame’s role in moral motivation. The chronic, 
totalizing shame our LGBT participants experience does not support humility as we define it, and it impedes 
thriving. In §6 we argue that the episodic shame experienced by heterosexual, cisgender allies can be a catalyst 
for moral virtue when supported by both humility and virtuous pride. Synthesizing data from both groups, we 
conclude that humility–pride constitutes a single virtuous disposition that supports a person’s liability to 
experience shame as a catalyst for moral improvement. 
2. Methods 
From 2014–2018, we conducted approximately 489 hours of participant observation and conducted 113 semi-
structured interviews with 102 participants in this movement, averaging 90 minutes.4 We focused on the Gay 
Christian Network (GCN, now Q Christian Fellowship), which was founded in 2001 to connect gay, and now 
lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, queer, intersex, and asexual (LGBTQIA) (conservative) Christians to each 
other for support and works to foster respect and compassion in disagreement; The Reformation Project (TRP), 
which was founded in 2012 with the explicit agenda of advocating for conservative Protestant churches to affirm 
LGBT identities and same-sex marriage, taking an explicitly intersectional approach to social justice; the Marin 
Foundation (TMF), a Chicago-based organization that advocates dialogue and respect between conservative 
Christians and the LGBT community; and the Center for Inclusivity (CFI), which takes an explicitly affirming 
position regarding LGBTQIA2S+ (2S refers to Native American Two-Spirit people; + indicates those not listed who 
have similar issues) people and a broad approach to intersectional justice, thematizing racism, sexism, able-ism, 
cissexism, and religious bigotry in addition to sexuality. Our goal is not to generalize about this movement, but 
to understand in depth the experiences that people bring to it in order to revise and extend previous theories 
(Burawoy, 1998).  
Participant-observation took place at discussions, workshops, conferences, and other events sponsored by these 
four organizations. We learned about the movement by straddling the line between participant and observer, 
participating enough not to distract others, asking and answering questions when appropriate. We jotted notes 
by hand during the meetings and elaborated them soon after events to preserve detail. We recruited most 
interview participants during participant-observation, or they were referred to us by previous participants. 
Interviews were typically conducted by one researcher and recorded with permission. They were held in a place 
of the participant’s choosing, such as their office or a restaurant, or if necessary through video conferencing, and 
ranged from 50 to 210 minutes, averaging about 90 minutes. Interviews were semi-structured around a set of 
relevant topics, allowing respondents to determine content and pace, with follow-up questions asked when 
more explanation was needed (Emerson, Fretz and Shaw 1995, Lofland et al., 2006).  Participants in the 
movement referred us to articles and blogs that they saw as significant to explaining their perspectives. 
Interviews were professionally transcribed, and along with speech transcripts, published materials (blogs and 
articles), and fieldnotes, were kept and coded in a searchable database using Nvivo.5 
Our ethnographic methods serve as a bridge between positivistic studies and philosophical arguments built 
entirely on hypothetical situations and conceptual analysis. As with any ethnographic research, our results are 
not strictly replicable, so to ensure the accuracy of our interpretations and analyses, we consulted with 
participants and leaders in the movement. The strength of our methods lies not in generalizability, but in the 
depth of the meanings and experiences captured. 
3. Experiencing shame in social relations  
To define shame, we draw from philosophers (Ahmed, 2015; Calhoun, 2004; Shotwell, 2011; Taylor, 1985; 
Thomason, 2015; Velleman, 2001;), psychologists (H. Lewis, 1971; M. Lewis, 1992; Tompkins, 1995), theologians 
(Fowler, 1996) and sociologists (Scheff, 2000; Stein, 2006). Analysis of these studies in light of our qualitative 
research leads us to define shame as an inwardly directed emotion with three central aspects: (1) painful 
exposure as a defective self; (2) fear of a break in an important social bond on the basis of that exposure; and (3) 
a sense of powerlessness over one’s identity. Scholars often initially define shame by distinguishing it from guilt, 
which is action oriented and more readily fixable. By contrast, shame is person-based and says, ‘I am bad’ in all 
or some respects.6 The pain of shame is not just the disappointment of realizing that one is flawed; it is the pain 
of feeling exposed as flawed in ways that one fears will make important others question one’s worthiness for 
relationship and belonging (Lewis, 1971; Thomason, 2015; Velleman, 2001). People describe the affect of shame 
as awful, as wanting to hide, ‘disappear into the ground,’ as having racing and obsessive thoughts about one’s 
failings, which make it difficult to focus on anything else (Karlsson & Sjoberg, 2009). Yet even as shame signals 
desire to withdraw, it simultaneously indicates a longing for acceptance, love, to ‘reconstitute the interpersonal 
bridge’ (Ahmed, 2015; Sedgwick, 2003). Shame protects the social bond by reminding us that others’ 
experiences of us matter (Calhoun, 2004; Fowler, 1996; Lewis, 1992; Scheff, 2000; Stein, 2006; Thomason, 
2015). 
We find it helpful to clarify the nature of the bond that the ashamed person fears breaking. It can include both a 
sense of belonging within a community and what Buber ([1923] 1970) called I–thou relationship, the intimate, 
ego-free connection he distinguished from the more superficial and ego-driven I–it experience. Relationship, in 
Buber’s sense, is not just any routine interaction, but a feeling of boundless connection and profound equality in 
which the self ‘has no borders,’ is open to growing and changing as a result of interpersonal connection (p. 55). 
We argue that shame reflects an experience of disruption in interpersonal connection at this level. 
Shame experiences vary in their temporal dimension. People can experience shame either in isolated episodes 
that come on suddenly, or as a chronic state of being (Lehtinen, 1998; Woodward, 2000).7 A person is liable to 
feel shame as episodic when loss of rank or status in the eyes of others is not generally expected, and so they 
feel shame as a sudden exposure that lowers their standing. In contrast, when shame is chronic, a person’s 
feelings of painful exposure, fear of rejection, and powerlessness do not appear as sudden, unexpected 
intrusions into an otherwise undisturbed consciousness, but as an internalized disposition and way of feeling 
emotionally at home in the world. In a therapeutic context, Bradshaw (1988) writes:  
Shame as a healthy emotion can be transformed into shame as a state of being. As a state of being, shame takes 
over one’s whole identity. To have shame as an identity is to believe that one’s being is flawed, that one is 
defective as a human being. Once shame is transformed into an identity, it becomes toxic and dehumanizing. (p. 
xvii) 
For those with a disposition of shame, acute shame feelings confirm their sense that they were unworthy all 
along (Lehtinen, 1998, p. 62). Our data show that episodic shame may have moral benefit for some people 
under certain conditions; however, when shame becomes a person’s habitual way of navigating the world, it 
violates the self and can harm their ability to cultivate virtues that support healthy relationships and moral 
action.8 
4. Dispositional shame for LGBT conservative Christians  
In order to understand why many conservative Protestant churches actively dispense shame toward those with 
same- or multi-sex attractions or different experiences of gender, we need to understand the narrative that 
conventionally frames conservative Christian thinking about gender and sexuality. These churches maintain that 
God’s plan for creation includes two opposite complementary sexes, male and female, intended by God to be 
united in marriage. They see binary gender in the book of Genesis not as a general description but as a tacit 
commandment, unspoken because it’s so obvious, preceding the Ten Commandments in time and importance 
(Moon and Tobin, 2018; see Mohler, 2014). Conventional conservative Protestants hold and generate what 
Bourdieu (1989) called symbolic power by repeating this interpretation of Scripture and positing same-sex 
attraction and variant experiences of gender to be sinful violations of it, separating a person from God and the 
community or even indicating rebellion against God (Gagnon, 2001; Mohler, 2014; Strachan, 2014).  
When communities assume that the behaviors they associate with LGBT identities are sinful, shame might seem 
like an appropriate emotion, the way shame over alcoholism or the temptation to cheat on one’s spouse can 
inspire better behavior and a redeemed identity. But our data show that shame does not help ‘fix’ sexual 
orientation and gender variance the way it works for sins such as theft or lying. Sexual orientation and gender 
experience do not themselves rupture relationship but are part of the basis from which a person relates to 
others. Rather than helping to restore relationships, shame directed at these aspects of a person targets their 
ability to have relationships in the first place. Elsewhere we unpack this shaming dynamic, which we call 
sacramental shame (Moon and Tobin, 2018). 
Sexual orientation and gender identity do not generally respond to acts of will, and this relative immutability 
makes shame in these cases not an episodic disruption, but a chronic condition. It perpetually disrupts a 
person’s ability to realistically assess their strengths and weaknesses and to love and serve others. Many of our 
respondents are told that they are unfit for ministry or even church membership. They are constantly reminded 
that their capacities to love and know God and themselves are broken and dangerous, and that they must fix 
themselves before they can serve others. A white, gay respondent in his late twenties whom we call Jimmy had 
attended a 10-week ex-gay9 residential program and observed that some participants continually re-enrolled; 
their sexuality did not change, and meanwhile, they in effect ‘hid from life’ rather than serving others. A gay 
African American man we call Jamal was permitted to lead a ministry on the condition that he continued to live 
as celibate. Even with this acceptance, he was regarded with suspicion. Once, his pastor summoned him to 
address another member’s claim to have seen him ‘on a date,’ which would cause them to remove him from 
ministry. Jamal had to ask whether the church allowed him to leave the house and have a nice time with 
another person, or if he could only go out alone or in groups. Unmarried heterosexuals were also expected to 
abstain from sex, but were never questioned in this way. This constant suspicion and surveillance reinforced the 
feeling of perpetually needing to prove his worthiness. 
Many LGBT participants speak of experiencing shame’s effects as toxic, poisoning not just relationships, but their 
mental and even physical health. Some speak of depression and attempts at suicide, and others speak of 
surprising physical consequences, including a black respondent in her twenties being hospitalized with 
uncontrollable asthma attacks, a healthy mixed-race respondent in her early twenties being hospitalized with a 
heart rate of 19, and a former Nashville Christian music superstar contracting a rare and life-threatening auto-
immune disorder (Strudwick, 2014), all of which doctors could only attribute to the intense stress caused by 
their shame around gender and sexuality and the fear that they would lose their places in the church. 
Drawing from Fowler (1996), Brownson (2013) suggests that this toxicity comes from vague and mixed messages 
like ‘We love you, but we abhor the way you operate emotionally’ (p. 216). Our data suggest that what is toxic is 
not just the mixed messages, but the fact that church members (sometimes unintentionally) break relationship 
with an LGBT person, posit that the rupture is the LGBT person’s fault, and leave no way for the latter to fix it. 
LGBT respondents say things like ‘I lost about eighty percent of my friends when I stopped being celibate,’ or ‘I 
was thrown out of my home when I came out to my parents,’ and even their heterosexual, cisgender supporters 
lose relationships. 
When shame motivates people to restore relationships they have broken, they tend to feel closer to God. 
However, for LGBT conservative Christians who have internalized their churches’ teachings and who spend years 
trying to rid themselves of their attractions or suppress their experience of gender, the absence of change 
creates the feeling that no matter how desperately they love God, God must not love them and that God’s 
rejection of them is their fault. For many of these respondents, shame is both totalizing —the whole self is 
chronically experienced as defective—and is instilled as a disposition. In his blog and in person, Kevin Garcia has 
eloquently described how chronic, sacramentalized shame about his same-sex attractions nearly killed him, both 
spiritually and literally. He writes: 
These unwanted homosexual attractions were something I viewed as . . . a cancer to be cured, a tumor on my 
heart to be cut out. I was terrified to share my torment with many people because I was ashamed. I was told that if 
I just prayed the right prayers, if I fasted, if I did the ‘heart work,’ that maybe, hopefully, God would grant me the 
grace to overcome these temptations. But nothing ever worked. Not therapy, not prayer, not getting ‘demons’ cast 
out of me, not fasting, not group confessions, not holy oil, nothing. For ten years I was convinced it was something 
wrong with me. It had to be me. I wasn’t ever going to be good enough for God because I wasn’t strong enough to 
overcome this trial . . What was the fruit of that labor? Literal death. I wanted to kill myself and nearly did. . . . I 
tried to kill myself because I saw my heart as incontrovertibly damaged. I believed my soul was marred beyond any 
hope of healing. (Garcia, 2016) 
 
LGBT respondent after respondent recounts this kind of experience—of constant and seemingly unending 
shame and coming to believe that their capacity for relationship was so dangerous that they could not indulge it 
even in friendships, leading to lives cut off from intimacy and bonding of any kind (Moon and Tobin, 2018). A 25-
year-old mixed-race respondent we call Emily spoke in an interview of having realized she had same-sex 
attractions right around the same time in high school that she became Christian. Having appreciated the 
redemptive possibility of the ex-gay movement at the time, she ascribed to what they considered her 
‘brokenness,’ ‘being a “gift to your community,” a service to the other people in your life who have kids. And 
you can kind of uniquely fit this niche of a social helper.’ She continued: 
To hate this part of myself so much that I spent 80 percent of my energy every single day attempting to eradicate 
it—it felt holy. It felt like that was what was making me righteous . . . I can specifically . . . remember instances of 
crying out to God . . . ‘Even if you don’t take this away from me, this suffering is more than okay. Because I believe 
you love me that much. I would do anything for this cause. And if the difficulty of my life testifies to the extent of 
which your love has covered the brokenness of all of humanity, then I will do this for the rest of my life.’ And, 
unfortunately, that’s sort of masochistic, and, over time, I think, really begins to . . . impact the way a person 
doesn’t just relate to themselves, but relates to their friends, relates to their family members, and even relates to 
God. And I found myself unconsciously shutting down connection. . . . I am an extrovert. I do love people. And I can 
listen to stories and laugh and have a good time. And so it was bizarre to [my friends] that, inside, I was crumbling 
in every moment because I was so fervently policing myself and making sure that I did not let myself go too far 
emotionally with someone, lest I start to have this idea that I would want to share life with them, and experience 
intimacy at any level with them. 
In the grip of chronic shame, Emily lost a sense of herself as someone capable and worthy of I–thou relationship 
with others.  
So many LGBT conservative church members experience dispositional shame that the GCN held a conference 
breakout session on shame resilience, which one of us attended as a participant-observer. In the course of small 
group conversation, she asked whether people thought there could be such a thing as healthy shame or whether 
shame might ever be appropriate to feel in the face of serious wrongdoing, for example. The question was met 
with a unanimous and resounding ‘No!’ Participants had been so harmed by shame that they saw no value in it. 
When shame becomes a disposition, the liability to feel it does not retain moral value. 
5. Shame, humility, and moral motivation 
Several philosophers argue that feeling shame in the face of moral failings or flaws can motivate people to virtue 
(or at least curb tendencies toward vice). Flanagan (2013) examines the addict’s shame as an appropriate moral 
response to the normative failures of addiction, and Shotwell (2011) discusses how white shame can be a 
catalyst for antiracist action. Manion (2002) argues that shame is more likely than guilt to induce positive moral 
transformation for two reasons: because shame targets a flawed self and not just a person’s actions, and 
because shame comes on suddenly and unexpectedly, halting agency and jolting an individual into self-doubt 
about her presumed standing as a good person. Shame forces a person to confront the gap between the person 
they really are and the person they want to be. 
Like many philosophers who defend moral shame, Manion (2002, pp. 83–84) speaks in general terms about its 
moral potential, but her analysis only describes one kind of shame experience: episodic shame that is felt about 
parts of the self by people who already feel worthy, whose moral standing in the community is not routinely 
threatened. Our data affirm that this type of shame experience may sometimes serve as a moral wake-up call 
where people confront the moral standards they endorse and see how their moral character falls short of those 
standards. But as we have learned from our LGBT respondents, and as the psychological data on shame attest, 
shame very often leads to self-harm and sometimes even self-destruction, and it prevents people from feeling 
that they can do good in the world. This reality has led some philosophers to defend moral shame more 
cautiously and indirectly by considering what is morally wrong with shamelessness, an invulnerability to feeling 
shame in the face of others’ shaming criticisms (Mason, 2010; Thomason, 2015). 
In her defense of shame’s moral value, Thomason (2015) writes, ‘Being shameless is bad because it signals a 
person’s failure to recognize . . . that their own point of view is not the only point of view that matters’ in 
determining their identity and how well they are doing, morally speaking (pp. 20–21).10 It is easy to believe that 
we are more virtuous than we really are, and to rationalize away or deny our moral shortcomings. Thomason 
argues that at least a liability to feel shame seems essential to morality because it is linked with humility—the 
willingness to admit that we might be wrong about ourselves —and specifically to the recognition that other 
people’s perspectives of who we are matter in our self-estimation.11 Thomason does not define humility, but 
her account suggests that she thinks it involves openness to others exposing our flaws that we might either fail 
to perceive in ourselves, deny, or rationalize. To the extent that I acknowledge, even embrace this vulnerability 
to other people, I am open to learning from them and potentially being transformed by relationship with them. 
We situate humility as a virtuous mean state between the vices of pride (Roberts, 2009) and the vices of 
deficiency, including self-abasement, self-abnegation, and servility (Snow, 1995; Whitcomb, Battaly, Baehr, & 
Howard-Snyder, 2015). Roberts (2009) and Roberts and Wood (2007) note that the driving concern for the 
viciously proud is self-importance, a preoccupation with puffed-up status. Humility, they argue, is having no 
concern for self-importance; the humble are those who lack the vices of pride. Their unconcern with status frees 
them up to pursue their projects without worrying about how they will appear or whether they get credit, for 
example. This understanding of humility as a lack rather than as having any positive content opens up counter-
intuitive possibilities, which Roberts and Wood themselves acknowledge, such as the humble white supremacist 
(Roberts, 2016, p. 187)12 or the humble Nazi (Roberts & Wood, 2007, p. 241). 
We agree that humility enables unconcern with self-importance, but in our view it is because humility is a 
substantive moral virtue. We follow those who define humility as a disposition to be aware and take ownership 
of one’s flaws and limitations (Snow, 1995; Whitcomb et al., 2015) but we add to this definition that humility is 
also always concerned to prioritize relationship. From their research with two intentional communities, Spezio, 
Peterson, and Roberts (2019) came to a similar conclusion. The ‘humble white supremacist’ is impossible in our 
view because white supremacy encourages allegiance to the ego, in particular one’s inflated self-concept as 
superior; humility requires allegiance to relationship, which cannot be premised on superiority (Buber, [1923] 
1970, p. 167). 
This aspect of humility—concern to prioritize relationship—also helps explain what links humility and shame. 
Feelings of shame indicate that a person fears losing and wants to maintain or re-establish what humility 
disposes us to preserve: relationship. The longing for relationship that shame communicates is a longing for 
what humility makes possible and motivates us to prioritize. When dispositional shame leads to the vices of 
deficiency, this longing is distorted; the person comes to feel wholly unworthy of relationship. Other people’s 
degrading narratives have too much authority over my self-estimation and I come to accept that perspective as 
the basis of my self-concept. 
Humility thus sits opposed both to vicious pride (Roberts, 2009) and to the vices of deficiency (Snow, 1995). 
Openness and vulnerability to others are not themselves virtuous if one’s vulnerability collapses the self into 
others and obscures one’s own worthiness from view (Narvaez, 2014, p. 304). Building on Thomason’s 
argument, shamelessness blocks relationship by closing people off to others as a source of selfknowledge and 
mutual connection, and habituated shamefulness blocks relationship by making them excessively vulnerable to 
others’ degrading treatment.13 Our LGBT participants teach us that contrary to Thomason’s claim, the liability 
to feel shame does not itself indicate the presence of humility. 
The dispositional shame instilled in our respondents by their faith communities encourages the vices of 
deficiency, which in turn reinforce their liability to experience shame as a catalyst for self-harm and cutting 
themselves off from relationship. Dispositional shame in this context can make people feel chronically unworthy 
not only of relationship, but even virtue itself because trusted loved ones and moral guides relentlessly impugn 
their capacity for moral goodness and often bar them from serving others. 
Not all shame is dispositional, and the episodic, partial shame experiences that Manion and others defend can 
have moral value. However, philosophers have not explained adequately why relatively privileged people 
experiencing episodic shame would respond with moral improvement rather than, say, hostile defensiveness, 
rationalization, or scapegoating. The heterosexual, cisgender allies we heard from help us to see under what 
conditions shame can lead to moral betterment. 
6. The humility and shame of allies 
Some heterosexual, cisgender conservative Christians change their minds, learn about and from LGBT people, 
apologize for prior attitudes and behaviors, and treat LGBT church members in a way that feels more like love to 
everyone involved. The motivation to love is not limited to those who come to support same-sex marriage. They 
take many perspectives, but all in this category reject their church’s treatment of LGBT people as a special 
category of sinners, second-class church members whom one should keep at arm’s length until they have 
‘overcome’ their sinfulness. One theme that dominates these responses is that their minds and hearts changed 
because they desired to protect relationship. We argue that humility supports this desire and sets the stage for 
experiencing shame as a catalyst for moral improvement. 
Some respondents explicitly attribute their change of heart to their concern for relationship. A white, former 
megachurch pastor we call Richard explained that it was his relationship with a gay friend that exposed his ‘blind 
spots’ about gay people’s experiences in the church and made him realize that relationship is key to learning 
how to love as Jesus modeled and commanded. In an interview, he shared: 
[I]t was a complete blind spot to me until I was in a [friend] relationship [with a gay person. . . .] [Y]ou’re dealing 
with people and you need to engage in conversations with them. You need to sit across from a gay or lesbian 
friend of yours who can . . . say, ‘This is really hurtful. You saying that my relationship is like incest is really hurtful. 
You saying that it’s like bestiality really dehumanizes my partner.’ But you need to be able to have that 
conversation with someone that you’re not going to dismiss as left-wing, you know, crazy LGBT activist type. But if 
you don’t allow yourself to be in a relationship it’s very easy . . . and that’s where I think a lot of folks in the church 
misstep. 
An Arab-American megachurch pastor we call Edward had a close friend who led the music in his church and 
who came out to him in tears, terrified that he would sever the friendship and fire her. He recalled: 
[T]hat just wrecked me. It was over from there. . . . When one of your best friends who is like, like as close to the 
inner circle, whatever that means, as you can be, is still afraid [of you . . .] I just—we couldn’t go another day with 
that, you know? 
This pastor’s friendship mattered to him and when he realized that his friend was afraid of him, the questions 
that arose over his self-concept as a good friend and a loving Christian led him to change his church’s policies.  
But other participants who sincerely want to love and care for their LGBT family member or friend often do not 
respond this way, and instead mobilize to ‘fix’ the person’s ‘broken’ gender or sexuality. What leads a person 
who realizes a relationship they value is threatened to question themselves and their role in breaking the 
relationship, rather than to deny or rationalize the brokenness, or to blame another? Stories shared from other 
allies indicate humility makes this difference.  
When the eventual founder of TRP, Matthew Vines, first told his father, Monte, that he was gay and wanted to 
pursue a same-sex marriage and still be Christian, Monte’s desire to preserve their relationship made him not 
want to be the one who denied his son that path. Describing his approach a few years later on a panel of parents 
of LGBT people at a Reformation Project conference, he clearly showed the connection between humility and a 
desire to preserve relationship. He said: 
I had invested so much of myself into creating a good relationship with Matthew, and I was hoping to enjoy this 
good relationship for the rest of my life. And I was afraid that if I failed to affirm him in his desire for a same-sex 
relationship and a same-sex life, that could undermine our good relationship. . . . I needed to be able to speak from 
a position of authority, meaning that I knew what I was talking about, and I knew that I really didn’t. Not that I had 
any question that my position was right, of course it was right. [audience laughter] 
So I committed to Matthew that I would undertake a [Bible] study with him. . . . And I thought if we studied the 
Bible together, he would see . . . in God’s own words that this is not what God approves of and he was going to 
have to deal with that himself. . . . And to my great surprise . . . I found myself changing my understanding about 
this . . . as we went through the Bible passages. 
Monte remarked that prior to this event, he had found the whole question distasteful. Now, his interpretation of 
Scripture was shaped not by disgust, but by a relationship of respect and love that he wished to protect. 
Concern to prioritize relationship over their narrative can lead people to recognize the possibility of being wrong 
and become open to transformation.  
Again and again, heterosexual, cisgender people come to this movement from a place of humility—‘Maybe I 
really don’t know what I’m talking about’—that is evoked by their desire to prioritize relationship with LGBT 
people, with coworkers, ministry members, children, siblings, hiking buddies, and neighbors.14 Humility leads a 
person to cultivate the vulnerability necessary to learn from another, even about deeply-held and communally-
enforced truths regarding God’s order and their own privileged place in it.  
Acute feelings of shame in the moment can make a person cringe, want to turn away, and feel temporarily 
unable to act, but humility fosters allegiance to relationship and can help them to channel that shame as a 
catalyst for moral improvement, to avoid letting arrogance break relationship. Humility allows shame to catalyze 
change so they can be the person they aspire to be, one who loves others authentically, as they believe Jesus 
modeled and commanded. Edward, the megachurch pastor, shared: 
Our approach, specifically with the LGBT community, is just not working. . . . Our theology and our reality aren’t 
matching, yet we’re trying so hard on a broad scale in the Christian community to change our reality, as opposed 
to reexamining our theology, and that’s just not working. It’s hurting people. It’s creating a lot of damage. . . . I 
don’t understand that resistance a lot of times because it just seems like it would be so simple to be like ‘Well, 
maybe if we at least, just for a second, consider the fact that we might be wrong,’ it would open up a lot of 
people’s hearts and minds and bring a lot of healing that is so desperately needed around this topic. 
7. Humility–pride as the basis for virtuous shame experiences 
Our study helps bridge the gap between philosophical ideals touting the moral benefits of shame and empirical 
realities showing shame’s moral fragility and riskiness. Shame can be a powerful moral motivator, but only when 
people are emotionally able to embrace vulnerability to others and experience the exposure of their flaws and 
shortcomings without losing sight of their own worthiness. What enables people to retain this sense of their 
basic worthiness so that their openness to others does not slide into servility or belittlement? Drawing on data 
from both groups, we think that virtuous pride, which supports self-respect, protects the self from the vices of 
deficiency and contributes to the conditions that enable people to experience shame virtuously. 
Roberts (2009) defines pride as a boost in feeling when one perceives that something worthy of praise is in some 
sense mine. For LGBT Christians who have endured chronic, sacramental shame, the thing of value that needs to 
be claimed as theirs is basic human worth. This form of proper pride—confidence in one’s own basic goodness, 
in Christian terms, as created in the image of and loved by God—is often cultivated either in the experience of a 
direct message from God, or in recognizing the human worth of other LGBT people (Edman, 2016). Proper pride 
is part of what helps our LGBT participants recover from chronic shame. Cultivating proper pride pulls them back 
from the self-abnegation and self-abasement that chronic shame instilled in them and restores the humility that 
enables them to experience shame in a healthy way, not about the totality of who they are, but about specific 
imperfections of character that they can work to improve. They know they are worthy to love and serve others, 
to strive to be like Jesus. One respondent, a 27-year-old white gay man we call Greg, told us that after he had 
worked through his struggle with sacramental shame, claiming and affirming his sexuality, he recovered his 
ability to experience shame in a healthy way. He reflected: 
I probably make mistakes, do things that I shouldn’t have done, that I’m ashamed of, that’s normal. And . . . the 
reasons I’m ashamed or feel like it’s wrong are not because of my sexuality but just normal things any straight 
person would get caught up in or be ashamed of as well. I see it as, okay, this has nothing to do with my sexuality. 
Similarly, heterosexual, cisgender church members who become allies to LGBT people have relatively privileged 
identities in this community and may have never had their capacity for moral goodness routinely shamed, 
questioned, and doubted as a result of their sexuality or gender identity. Proper pride gives people confidence in 
their basic worth which enables them to withstand painful moral scrutiny without losing a sense of their basic 
goodness, even as they recognize and feel ashamed of their moral flaws.  
Seeing how both humility and pride function together in supporting a liability to feel shame in a virtuous way 
leads us to echo philosophers and psychologists who affirm that humility and proper pride are two sides of a 
single virtuous disposition, but we extend these accounts (Narvaez, 2014; Whitcomb et al., 2015).15 We 
advocate the term humility–pride to keep alive the fact that we are talking about a disposition that: (1) is 
grounded in desire to prioritize relationship; (2) enables realistic self assessment of strengths and limitations; 
and (3) enables people to embrace their vulnerability to others in a way that can acknowledge and withstand 
the painful truths about the self those others expose, rather than defensively protect their self-concept or 
excessively belittle themselves. Humility–pride makes a person both appropriately vulnerable to the other and 
open to self-scrutiny, and it gives one a stable, strong enough sense of their own worth to withstand the painful 
exposure of their moral flaws and use that exposure in the service of moral improvement. This emotional 
backdrop of humility–pride enables a person to experience shame—that emotional red flag that we may be 
failing our relationships—not as self-abasement or denial of the other, but as a catalyst for love. 
As an interdisciplinary team, we hope that our contribution may help advance scholarship in a number of fields. 
Our refined definitions of shame and humility may help provide clearer concepts for analysis and more precise 
definitions for empirical researchers to operationalize. Drawing from our qualitative data, we have made several 
arguments that could form hypotheses to test in empirical studies attuned to the social constitution of the self. 
Future research might distinguish between episodic and chronic shame, for instance, and examine whether and 
to what extent each form promotes and impedes thriving, or examine the extent to which the presence of 
chronic shame affects the results of episodic shaming. Empirical researchers might also examine the extent to 
which various definitions of humility (or humility–pride) hold explanatory power with regard to positive 
outcomes. Our research suggests fruitful directions for philosophical work too, exploring the conceptual viability 
of treating humility and pride as two aspects of a single virtuous disposition. Philosophers might also pursue the 
underexplored role of arrogance as an obstacle to experiencing shame virtuously. 
Notes  
1. LGBT is an abbreviation for a number of categories often invoked together because of the similar challenges 
their existence poses to complementarian thought, but people do not always talk about all of these categories 
and sometimes they include others. The reader is most likely familiar with the terms lesbian and gay. Bisexual 
refers to people who have the capacity to be attracted to another person regardless of that person’s sex or 
gender. Transgender refers to people whose gender identity does not match the sex they were assigned at birth; 
it includes those who are of the other binary sex category as well as those who identify with no sex/gender or in 
between sexes/genders. Our analysis here focuses primarily on lesbians and gay men, as they are talked about 
the most. Bisexual, trans, and intersex people face similar dynamics, complicated by evangelicalism’s general 
lack of discourse around them. In addition to those referenced in LGBT, this movement also sometimes includes 
people who for a variety of reasons identify as queer (Q), but since most people who identify as queer also 
identify as something else on the list, and because queer has so many meanings, we omit it from our analysis. 
Intersex (I) refers to people whose bodies are born not conforming to binary ideas about sex, and intersex 
people are often misgendered from birth. This movement sometimes embraces asexuals (A; experiencing no 
sexual desires) and/or Native American two-spirit people (2S; embracing traditional third and fourth sex 
categories/roles). We do not have enough data to speak to these categories. The refusal to acknowledge the 
existence of all of these categories causes much of the harm discussed here.  
2. Cisgender means agreeing with the sex assignment given at birth; not transgender.  
3. We leave open the possibility that anger may be a morally appropriate and psychologically healthy response 
in extreme conditions of structural injustice or oppression that routinely assault their personhood and psyche 
(hooks, 1995; Lugones, 2003).  
4. Alicia Crosby, of CFI, assisted us by interviewing LGBTQI people of color who might not have wished to be 
interviewed by white women. After being briefed on our interviewing methods by Moon, she conducted 40 of 
our 113 interviews, averaging 60 minutes.  
5. As a qualitative sociologist, Moon trained Tobin in these methods. 
6. Guilt stops the action and can reset the agent on a different, better course of action to redress the 
transgression; shame freezes agency, signaling that the self is bad and not just its activities—that the self one is 
threatens the social bond (see Lewis, 1992, p. 35).  
7. Some psychological studies of shame measure what they call dispositional shame, by which they mean the 
degree to which a person is shame-prone or disposed to feel shame, which seems to lead to poor psychological 
and behavioral outcomes (see summary of this work in Deonna, Raffaele, & Teroni, 2012, especially pp. 42–67). 
We speak of ‘dispositional shame’ slightly differently, to indicate situations in which shame has become instilled 
in the person as an enduring emotional outlook.  
8. Lewis (1992, pp. 164–173) reports that chronic shame often becomes pathological and can in severe cases 
result in psychological disorders including narcissism and multiple personality disorders.  
9. ‘Ex-gay’ therapies often suggest that homosexuality or gender variance can be healed. Many conservative 
Christians started to accept that these did not work in 2013, when the president of the ex-gay umbrella 
organization, Exodus, shuttered the organization and went on US cable television to issue an apology to all he 
and the ministries had harmed.  
10. Similarly, Mason (2010) argues that the shameless person makes their self-concept definitive of who they 
are and places no other-regarding constraints on what they will allow themselves to be. The shameless aren’t 
vulnerable to experiencing a gap between their selfconcept and the moral identity their actions or other people 
expose them to be.  
11. Thomason’s argument rests on a distinction between morally good outcomes and moral value independent 
of outcomes. Her point is that even in cases where feeling shame leads to morally bad outcomes, the liability to 
feel it retains moral value independent of those outcomes because it indicates the presence of humility: a 
person’s self-understanding responding to others’ experiences of them.  
12. Roberts (2016) says, ‘If you are a white supremacist, we will deny that you are overall virtuous; your 
fundamental project, after all, is despicable despite [being egoistically disinterested]. But I think we have to 
admit that you have the virtue of humility’ (p. 187).  
13. Arrogance also closes people off to others as a source of self-knowledge and mutuality, but in a different 
way. Shamelessness means a person is invulnerable to feeling shame. By contrast, the arrogant are highly 
vulnerable to feeling shame but also highly likely to deny that vulnerability and to bypass their shame, which is 
another reason to doubt the inference from a liability to feel shame to humility.  
14. See, for instance Baldock (2014), Gritter (2014;) and Marin (2012).  
15. Narvaez (2014) gives a neurobiological explanation and defense of the argument that the balanced, ethically 
virtuous self is buoyed by two sides of a single virtuous disposition— humility (healthy vulnerability to/love of 
others) and virtuous pride (healthy forms of selflove) (pp. 302–305). 
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